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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
providing across-the-board salary increases for state offices. The
court reasoned that a more recent constitutional provision2' enabling
legislators to increase the salaries of state officers as well as their
own, superseded the earlier prohibitive constitutional provision,
because by any other interpretation, legislators could not increase
their own salaries without resigning.
The Utah Supreme Court has made a bold, practical step toward
the implementation of modern administrative practices in state
government. The court correctly reasons that the right to vote for
the candidate of one's choice is fundamental, 25 and that the con-
stitutional restriction regarding the creation or increase of emolu-
ments of civil offices should be limited to obvious "improper
machinations. ' 26 Although the electorate rejected the legislature's
recent attempt to amend North Dakota's constitutional provision,
27
the Utah approach would be a sensible alternative for the North
Dakota court, to facilitate the enactment of needed salary increases
for state offices without impairing leadership development in the
legislature. 28
SCOTT ANDERSON
INSURANCE-DEFENSE OF ACTIONS-DUTY TO DEFEND BEYOND
POLICY LIMITS-PLAINTIFFS, the insurers of certain bottled gas
distributors, sought a declaratory judgment relieving them of the
cost of defending suits arising out of a bottled gas explosion October
31, 1963. Plaintiffs admitted liability and joined a number of potential
claimants as defendants. The United States District Court found
that the fair settlement value of the suits filed would exceed the
insurance coverage and held that by interpleading the amount of
the policies, the plaintiffs had discharged their obligation under the
insurance contracts and were under no duty to defend suits brought
against their assureds. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F.
Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
An insurer's duty to defend, in the name of the insured, all suits
which fall within the limits of coverage is well settled.' The principal
controversy involves an insurer's duty to defend after coverage is
exhausted. Where an insurer has defended an action approaching
or equalling the policy limits and has asked to be relieved of further
24. S.D. CONST. art. 21, § 2.
25. Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 832; accord, State ex rel. Benson v. Schmahl.
supra note 16, at 795.
26. Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 831.
27. N.D. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 453, defeated In the primary election of June 30, 1964,
by 59,955 to 46,029.
28. See Shields v. Toronto, supra note 19, at 834.
1. See generally 31 N.D.L. Rev. 67 (1955).
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defense expenses, the courts have not been in agreement. A 1939
case 2 of major significance held that the insurer in this situation
was under no legal obligation to defend; since then a majority of
the courts have followed that decision, and consequently have found
no obligation to defend beyond the policy limits.
In interpreting the standard defense clause, 3 these courts have
usually based their decisions on one or more of the following argu-
ments: (1) In defending an action beyond the policy limits, the
insurance company would become an intermeddler in the contests
of others and would be guilty of unlawfully practicing law.4 (2) The
insurers are obligated to defend only those actions which come
within the terms of the policy; as the amount of coverage is one
of those terms, there is no further duty owed to the assured.5  (3) The
defense clause is considered to be generally for the benefit of the
insurer.6
In addition to contrary holdings that the defense clause is for
the benefit of the insured, 7 the following grounds have been used
as bases for holdings that there is a duty to defend: (1) The defense
clause and liability clause are two separate contracts; one may
continue to exist after the other has been exhausted.8 It may be
observed, however, that this interpretation may be violative of one
of the rules of contract construction that the terms of a contract
are to be interpreted and their legal effects determined as a whole.9
(2) The defense provisions are not dependent upon the exhaustion
of the specified coverage, but apply to accidents within the scope
of the hazards covered during the calendar life of the contract. 10
(3) If the insurers wish to relieve themselves of the obligation to
defend, they should so state in language comprehensible to the
average businessman without legal assistance."
Practically without exception,'1 2 the instant case'3 is unique in
that the insurer was allowed to interplead funds equal to the policy
2. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939).
3. See 4 RIcHARDs, INSURANCE 2095 (5th ed. Freedman, 1952): "As respects such
insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this policy: (1) the Company shall (a)
defend in his name and behalf any suit against the Insured alleging such injury and seek-
ing damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but
the Company shall have the right to make such Investigation, negotiation and settlement
of any claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the Company; and (b) pay . . . all
expenses incurred by the Company, all interest accruing after entry of judgment until the
Company has paid, tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does
not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon .. "
4. Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 207, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
5. Denham V. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 871 (1948).
6. E.g., Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, supra note 2; Johnson v. Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 At. 788 (1936).
7. American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
8. Ibid.
9. Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191, 257 Pac. 933 (1927) ; See generally 3
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 549 (1960).
10. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954).
11. Whlteside v. Insurafice Co., 274 App. Dlv. 36, 79 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1948).
12. Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., supra note 5.
13. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
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limits and in so doing be relieved of the costs of defense. Courts
which have held that there is no duty to defend beyond the policy
limits have expressly stated that they are opposed to allowing the
insurer to throw the funds on the table and be released from any
further liability;1 4 such a result has also been severely criticized
by authorities on this subject.15 If the courts follow the guideline
in the principal case, it seems the defense clause could be relegated
to a position of little or no importance, and damage to the principle
"that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay' 1' would
result.
Who should bear the cost of defending suits beyond the policy
limits? It appears the courts must attempt to balance the interests
of the insurer as contrasted with the competing interests of the
assured and the claimants in each action. The claimants are inter-
ested parties because any money expended by the assured for their
defense will be unavailable to pay judgments. Since insurance
companies are in a position in which they can adjust rates to include
the costs of defense, or expressly state that their policy does not
cover defense beyond the policy limits, they should be required to
bear the cost of defense unless the terms of the policy state
otherwise.
LEE WALL
14. Anchor Cas. Co. v. McCalab, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949); Lumberman's Mut
Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939) (dictum).
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954).
15. 7 APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4685 (1962): "[T]he insurer's duty is
both to defend actions and to pay Judgments obtained against the Insured. Otherwise,
where the damages exceed the policy coverage, the insurer could walk into court, toss the
amount of the policy on the table, and blithely inform the insured that the rest was up
to him. This would obviously constitute a breach of the insurer's contract to defend
actions against the insured, for which premiums nad been paid, and should not be tolerated
by the courts."
16. Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1.948).
